The Essential Facility Doctrine and the Health Care Industry by Makar, Scott D.
Florida State University Law Review
Volume 21 | Issue 3 Article 4
Winter 1994
The Essential Facility Doctrine and the Health Care
Industry
Scott D. Makar
Follow this and additional works at: http://ir.law.fsu.edu/lr
Part of the Antitrust and Trade Regulation Commons, and the Health Law and Policy Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Florida State University Law
Review by an authorized editor of Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact bkaplan@law.fsu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Scott D. Makar, The Essential Facility Doctrine and the Health Care Industry, 21 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 913 (1994) .
http://ir.law.fsu.edu/lr/vol21/iss3/4
THE ESSENTIAL FACILITY DOCTRINE AND THE
HEALTH CARE INDUSTRY
SCOTT D. MAKAR*
I. INTRODUCTION
HIS Article presents a critique of the antitrust essential facility
doctrine and its application in the health care industry. The essen-
tial facility doctrine,' a recent antitrust concept, requires the owner of
an "essential facility" to provide its business rivals with equal or non-
discriminatory use of, or access to, the facility on fair terms. The doc-
trine has been applied in a number of contexts, including formerly
regulated industries that have remnants of unregulated market power.2
In recent years, physicians, non-physician health care professionals,
and medical equipment suppliers have attempted to extend the doc-
trine to health care markets.' The doctrine's application in the health
care field raises a number of issues because of the competitive and
regulatory tensions health care providers confront. 4
The Article begins with an overview of the development of the es-
sential facility doctrine. The first section provides the legal back-
ground of the doctrine and a critique of the current essential facility
* Associate, Holland & Knight, Jacksonville and Tallahassee, Florida; B.S., 1980, Mercer
University; M.A., M.B.A., 1982, J.D., 1987, Ph.D., 1993, University of Florida. The author
expresses his appreciation to Professors Roger D. Blair, Sanford V. Berg, and Jeffrey L. Harri-
son for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this Article. The views expressed, however,
are solely those of the author.
1. The essential facility doctrine is also termed the "bottleneck" doctrine. Note, Unclog-
ging the Bottleneck: A New Essential Facility Doctrine, 83 COLUM. L. REv. 441, 441 (1983). The
"bottleneck" refers to an entry barrier that can arise where entry at multiple levels of production
is necessary for entrants to effectively compete with vertically integrated incumbent firms.
ROGER D. BLIR & DAVID L. KASEm.AN, ANTITRUST ECONOMICS 314-16 (1983) (discussing con-
cept of vertical integration as a barrier to entry).
2. See William B. Tye, Competitive Access: A Comparative Industry Approach to the Es-
sential Facility Doctrine, 8 ENERGY L.J. 337 (1987) (analysis of doctrine's application in rail-
road, electric utility, and natural gas industries).
3. See generally Sylvia H. Walbolt, el. al., Problems of Access to Health Facilities and
Equipment - New Competition for Limited Resources, 55 ANTITRUST L.J. 599 (1986) (panel dis-
cussion of developments in staff privileges, essential facilities, and relevant market definition).
4. See generally H. E. Frech, The Long-Lost Market in Health Care: Government and
Professional Regulation of Medicine, in A NEw APPROACH TO THE ECONOMICS OF HEALTH CARE
44, 45 (Mancur Olson, ed., 1981) (noting that "[medical care is, in fact, so heavily regulated
that it may be the most completely regulated sector of the economy").
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test. The legal foundation of the essential facility doctrine is based
upon the metaphor that firms controlling "essential facilities" or
"bottlenecks" must provide access to their competitors on fair and
reasonable terms.' This broad legal metaphor, however, has yet to
find support in any one explanatory theory. Commentators have
urged broad and narrow economic interpretations of the doctrine but
no consensus has formed. 6
Next the Article discusses the application of the doctrine to the
health care industry, focusing primarily on whether hospitals, staff
privileges, or exclusive supply contracts may be considered essential
facilities. Although such facilities may be "essential" to persons who
demand health care, courts have generally rejected claims that such
facilities are "essential" in an antitrust sense. These decisions are con-
sistent with the prevailing view that an "essential facility" must ex-
hibit the characteristics of a natural monopoly that rivals cannot
replicate and to which mandatory access is necessary in order to com-
pete. They are also consistent with traditional monopolization theory
which mandates access only as a remedial measure in those circum-
stances where access will increase long-run economic efficiency.
I THE ESSENTIAL FACILITY DOCTRINE
A. Legal Development of the Doctrine
Although predicated on the early United States Supreme Court case
United States v. Terminal Railroad Ass'n,7 the essential facility doc-
5. See Michael Boudin, Antitrust Doctrine and the Sway of Metaphor, 75 Gao. L.J. 395,
397 (1986).
6. Phillip Areeda, Essential Facilities: An Epithet in Need of Limiting Principles, 58 ANTi-
TRUST L.J. 841, 852 (1990) ("There is no general duty to share. Compulsory access, if it exists at
all, is and should be very exceptional."); James R. Ratner, Should There Be An Essential Facil-
ity Doctrine?, 21 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 327, 367 (1988) (discussing broad and narrow approaches
and suggesting that a successful essential facility claim requires that denial causes "welfare-
harmful output reduction" or "will increase or maintain the facility's market power."); David
J. Gerber, Rethinking the Monopolist's Duty to Deal: A Legal and Economic Critique of the
Doctrine of "Essential Facilities", 74 VA. L. REV. 1069 (1988) (arguing that doctrine should
apply to exceptional cases involving long-term, anti-competitive exclusions and natural monopo-
lies); Gregory J. Werden, The Law and Economics of the Essential Facility Doctrine, 32 ST.
Louts U. L.J. 433, 476, 479-80 (1987) ("A facility probably should be deemed essential only if it
is a natural monopoly[;]" legislative or administrative agencies, rather than the judiciary, should
regulate industries and the doctrine as an antitrust cause of action should be eliminated); John
Cirace, An Economic Analysis of Antitrust Law's Natural Monopoly Cases, 88 W. VA. L. REV.
677, 727 (1986) ("phenomena described by the [essential facility] doctrine are more accurately
analyzed by the theory of natural monopoly).
7. 224 U.S. 383 (1912). See David Reiffen & Andrew N. Kleit, Terminal Railroad Revis-
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trine is a relatively new antitrust theory that utilizes elements of both
the law of monopolization and refusals to deal." Over the past fifteen
years, plaintiffs increasingly have invoked the doctrine as a supple-
mental theory of antitrust liability in two situations. The first involves
attempts by rivals to access or use some "essential" facility or re-
source that a vertically-integrated firm controls.9 The claim is that the
rivals cannot compete effectively or enter the marketplace without ac-
cess to the essential or monopolized facility. The second involves a
group of firms who collectively produce or control some resource or
facility to which excluded rivals desire access.' 0 The claim is that the
group has collectively refused to deal with the excluded rivals and has
thereby unreasonably denied them the "essential" resource.
1. Monopolization
The first type of essential facility claim is in most respects a tradi-
tional monopolization claim. Monopolization" is based on a firm's
development and willful maintenance of "monopoly" power over a
particular product or service within a defined geographic market."
The antitrust laws do not condemn the structure of monopoly itself.
Instead, the laws condemn illegitimate business conduct that firms use
to achieve or maintain monopoly power. For example, a firm that
achieves monopoly power through superior operating efficiencies does
not violate the antitrust laws. 3 Similarly, a firm that survives the com-
petitive process in a market where only one firm can economically sur-
ited: Foreclosure ofan Essential Facility or Simple Horizontal Monopoly?, 33 J.L. & EcoN. 419,
437 (1990) (concluding that courts have misinterpreted the Terminal Railroad case and that the
essential facilities doctrine "may discourage efficient behavior without a corresponding benefit
in terms of deterring anticompetitive conduct."); Boudin, supra note 5, at 398 (stating that "Su-
preme Court decisions commonly cited for the doctrine by lower courts ... do not offer much
support.").
8. See Areeda, supra note 6, at 841.
9. MCI Communications Corp. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 708 F.2d 1081, 1132-33 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 891 (1983).
10. See, e.g., Century Air Freight, Inc. v. American Airlines, Inc., 597 F. Supp. 564, 571
(S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 738 F.2d 418 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1073 (1984).
!1. The Sherman Act, section 2, states that "[e]very person who shall monopolize, or at-
tempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize"
shall be guilty of a felony. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1988).
12. Monopoly power alone is not sufficient to establish a monopolization claim; there must
also be anticompetitive conduct evidencing a general intent to monopolize (i.e., willful mainte-
nance or acquisition). United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-11 (1966); LAWRENCE
ANTHONY SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST § 33, at 94 (1977).
13. Judge Learned Hand noted that "[a] single producer may be the survivor out of a
group of active competitors, merely by virtue of his superior skill, foresight and industry."
United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 430 (2d Cir. 1945).
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vive does not violate the antitrust laws (i.e., a natural monopoly).'
Thus, monopoly power that results from either superior efficiency or
natural monopoly is lawful.' To prevail on a monopolization claim, a
plaintiff must satisfy a two-part test which requires that the defendant
(1) have sufficient market power in the relevant product (or service) 6
and geographic markets, and (2) engage in anticompetitive conduct
that creates, protects, or perpetuates this power." In essential facility
cases, the market allegedly monopolized is the "essential facility" it-
self.
Under the first part of the monopolization test, the traditional
proxy for economic power is market share analysis (i.e., definition of
the relevant market and a determination of the defendant's market
share in that market).' Upon demonstrating a defendant has the req-
uisite level of market power, the plaintiff must show the defendant
engaged in anticompetitive conduct designed to maintain or expand
such power. '9 The defendant can justify its actions by establishing that
legitimate business reasons motivated its actions.2 0 Attempt to monop-
olize claims require proof of a dangerous probability of monopolizing
a particular market and the specific intent to monopolize. 2'
2. Refusals to Deal
The second type of essential facility claim is a refusal to deal, also
termed a boycott.2 Unilateral refusals to deal occur when a single
firm, often an alleged monopolist, refuses to deal with other firms or
customers. The current law generally grants individual firms the free-
dom to deal or refuse to deal with whomever they choose, unless the
refusal supports an illegal restraint or constitutes illegal monopoliza-
14. See Union Leader Corp. v. Newspapers of New England, 284 F.2d 582, 589-90 (1st Cir.
1960), ceri. denied, 365 U.S. 833 (1961). The court noted that a defendant who intends to suc-
ceed in ousting an incumbent natural monopolist through legitimate business practices does not
have the "exclusionary" intent necessary to establish a monopolization claim. Id. at 589-90.
15. The oft-cited proposition that "[the successful competitor, having been urged to com-
pete, must not be turned upon when he wins" applies in these situations as well as those involv-
ing the essential facility doctrine. See Aluminum Co. ofAm., 148 F.2d at 430.
16. References to product markets in this Article include service markets unless otherwise
indicated.
17. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966).
18. SULLIVAN, supra note 10, §§ 12-32, at 41-93.
19. Id. § 33-39, at 94-105.
20. See, e.g., Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 604-05
(1985).
21. Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, -.. U.S. - , 113 S. Ct. 884, 889-90 (1993).
22. Concerted refusals to deal are also termed group boycotts. E. THOMAS SULLIVAN & JEF-
FREY L. HARRISON, UNDERSTANDING ANTITRUST AND ITS ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS § 4.13, at 105
(1988).
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tion.23 Even a monopolist has no general duty to cooperate with its
business rivals.24 The general absence of a duty to deal with competi-
tors, however, does not necessarily mean that a refusal to deal cannot
be used as evidence to support a monopolization claim. 25 For example,
a monopolist's decision to end a joint marketing arrangement with its
competitors can be evidence of anticompetitive conduct perpetuating
the monopolist's power.
26
Collective or concerted refusals to deal, however, have traditionally
been classified as per se antitrust violations.27 These types of refusals
occur when two or more competitors agree to exclude another com-
petitor from access to some competitive advantage the group shares.
For instance, a group of competitors might attempt to increase its
own collective profits by increasing the costs of competing firms, re-
sulting in a reduction of competitive pressures as the higher cost firms
leave the marketplace. 28 Some scholars, however, have criticized the
per se label because it can repress legitimate efficiency-enhancing ac-
tivities. 29 In recent years, the Supreme Court has softened the per se
label's harshness by requiring antitrust plaintiffs to demonstrate that a
challenged concerted refusal to deal is predominantly anticompetitive
before applying the per se label .30
3. The Essential Facility Doctrine: An Antitrust Hybrid
The essential facility doctrine is an antitrust hybrid that combines
elements of monopolization and refusals to deal. The doctrine's reli-
ance on these two concepts raises the question whether the doctrine is
23. ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 344-46 (1978).
24. 472 U.S. at 600-01.
25. Id. at 601.
26. Id. at 600-05.
27. See Palmer v. BRG of Georgia, 498 U.S. 46, 49 (1990) (citing United States v. Topco
Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972)).
28. This concept is termed raising rivals' costs and is developed more fully in Thomas G.
Krattenmaker & Steven C. Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising Rivals' Costs To Achieve
Power over Price, 96 YAE L. J. 209 (1986) and Steven C. Salop & David T. Scheffman, Recent
Advances in the Theory of Industrial Structure: Raising Rivals' Costs, 73 AMER. ECON. REV. 267
(1983). A common example is a group collectively controlling some asset other competitors need
to enter the marketplace. See, e.g., Gamco v. Providence Fruit & Produce Bldg., Inc., 194 F.2d
484 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 817 (1952).
29. See BORK, supra note 23, at 330-44. Bork notes that some boycotts, so-called naked and
disguised naked boycotts, have no efficiency benefits and should be illegal. Id. at 334-37. How-
ever, certain ancillary boycotts which contribute to the efficiency of a cooperative economic
activity should be permissible. "In such cases one must look to the underlying restraint in order
to learn the efficiency potential of the boycott." Id. at 338.
30. See Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationary & Printing Co., 472 U.S.
284 (1985).
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redundant." A forceful argument exists that essential facility claims
can be analyzed under existing monopolization or refusal to deal law
without developing a new antitrust theory that combines elements of
both. Nonetheless, the essential facility doctrine has become well-es-
tablished in many jurisdictions.
B. The Essential Facility Test
The essential facility test actually involves two tests, a monopoliza-
tion test for unilateral conduct and a concerted refusal to deal test for
cooperative conduct. The monopolization test generally requires that
four elements be established:
(1) control of the essential facility by a monopolist;
(2) a competitor's inability to practically or reasonably duplicate
the essential facility;
(3) the denial of the facility's use to a competitor; and
(4) the feasibility of the owner's provision of access to the facility.3 2
Some courts have recognized various defenses to essential facility
claims such as a valid business reason for the denial of access.33 The
concerted refusal to deal test incorporates a fifth element:
(5) an agreement between the owner of the facility and some of the
potential entrant's competitors that prevents an equitable
sharing of the facility 4.3
This element provides the concerted action required to establish a
group boycott claim.
31. See, e.g., Ratner, supra note 6, at 327. The United States Supreme Court's decision in
Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp. is instructive. 472 U.S. 585 (1985). The
plaintiff in Aspen Skiing Co. prevailed on its monopolization claim without reliance on the doc-
trine. In fact, the Supreme Court expressly avoided addressing the essential facility claim because
existing antitrust theory was sufficient to prove liability. Id. at 611 n.44.
32. MCI Communications Corp. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 708 F.2d 1081, 1132-33 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 891 (1983). A number of circuits have adopted the four-part essen-
tial facility test. See Fishman v. Estate of Wirtz, 807 F.2d 520, 539 (7th Cir. 1986); Aspen High-
lands Skiing Corp. v. Aspen Skiing Co., 738 F.2d 1509, 1520-21 (10th Cir. 1984), aff'd on other
grounds, 472 U.S. 585 (1985); Hecht v. Pro-Football, Inc., 570 F.2d 982, 992-93 (D.C. Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 956 (1978).
33. See, e.g., Aspen Skiing Co., 472 U.S. at 595-599r. The trial court's jury instructions in
Aspen Skiing Co. Court stated "a company which possesses monopoly power and which refuses
to enter into a joint operating agreement with a competitor or otherwise refuses to deal with a
competitor in some manner does not violate Section 2 if valid business reasons exist for that
refusal." Id. at 597.
34. See, e.g.. Century Air Freight, Inc. v. American Airlines, Inc., 597 F. Supp. 564, 571
(S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 738 F.2d 418 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1073 (1984).
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Courts have applied different analytical labels to the essential facil-
ity doctrine. Some courts categorize the doctrine under a per se test,35
while others regard the test as a rule of reason approach.16 A strong
argument exists for a rule of reason. First, the essential facility doc-
trine is primarily based on the law of monopolization which uses a
rule of reason analysis. The law of monopolization does not condemn
the existence of a monopoly acquired by lawful means, nor should it
condemn a firm's creation of, or control over, an "essential" facility
acquired by lawful means. Further, the law of monopolization recog-
nizes a "business justification" defense which would have no purpose
under a per se analysis.
Second, the elements of the essential facility tests require economic
balancing of the pro-competitive and anti-competitive effects of exclu-
sion. This type of balancing approach is inconsistent with a per se
analysis. In addition, the essential facility tests contain a number of
different elements that require a detailed analysis of market structure.
The structural analysis embodied in the test makes it difficult for a
court to condemn exclusion outright without a thorough and thought-
ful economic analysis. A rule of reason approach, therefore, is most
appropriate.
Finally, a rule of reason-or at least a modified per se test-should
apply to essential facility claims based on a concerted refusal to deal
theory.17 This approach requires that a court make a detailed examina-
tion of the relevant market to determine, for example, whether the
defendants have monopoly or market power, whether entry barriers
exist, and whether there are legitimate business reasons for the alleged
exclusion. This approach stems from the trend in group boycott the-
ory that requires close scrutiny of whether the group of defendants
35. See, e.g., Robinson v. Magovern, 521 F. Supp. 842 (W.D. Pa. 1981), aff'd, 688 F.2d
824 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 971 (1982); Registered Physical Therapists, Inc. v. Inter-
mountain Health Care, Inc., 1988-2 Trade Cases 68,233 (D. Utah 1988); Castelli v. Meadville
Medical Ctr., 702 F. Supp. 1201, 1209 (W.D. Pa. 1988), aff'd, 872 F.2d 411 (3d Cir. 1989);
Pontius v. Children's Hosp., 552 F. Supp. 1352, 1370 (W.D. Pa. 1982).
36. One prominent health care antitrust expert has stated the doctrine is a rule of reason
test. See Clark C. Havighurst, Doctors and Hospitals: An Antitrust Perspective on Traditional
Relationships, 1984 DUKE L.J. 1071, 1112 (doctrine is "essentially a subcategory of the rule of
reason that applies to all competitor collaboration").
37. This modified per se approach stems from the decision in Northwest Wholesale Station-
ers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationary & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284 (1985), in which the Supreme Court
held that the per se rule does not apply in concerted refusal to deal cases unless an antitrust
plaintiff demonstrates that the cooperative from which the plaintiff was excluded "possesses
market power or unique access to a business element necessary for effective competition." Id. at
298.
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collectively has that level of market power necessary to make their
exclusion of rivals "predominantly anticompetitive.""
C. The Essential Facility Tests: Discussion of the Elements
1. Owner Must Monopolize and Control the "Essential Facility"
The first element of the essential facility test requires that a facili-
ty's owner be a monopolist. 9 This requirement is fundamental to the
proper application of the doctrine. A plaintiff must prove the facility
owner has the degree of monopoly power over the "essential facility"
that is required to establish an antitrust violation.4 For example, the
court in Consul, Ltd. v. Transco Energy Co.41 rejected the contention
that an essential facility claim does not require a threshold showing of
market power. 42 Instead, the court held that an essential facility plain-
tiff must utilize traditional market share analysis in establishing that
the facility owner is a monopolist.43
A few courts do not require a showing of monopoly power and in-
stead merely require a showing that access to the facility is in some
sense "essential." 44 Under this approach, an owner of an "essential
facility" who does not have sufficient market power to have monopo-
lized or attempted to monopolize any identifiable market may none-
theless be exposed to liability. For instance, a plaintiff who
demonstrates that a facility is "impractical" to duplicate and is
thereby "essential" can sidestep the traditional market power require-
ment. This approach runs counter to the United States Supreme
Court's recent reaffirmation of the principle that factual findings of a
defendant's market power and the intent to misuse such power are
fundamental underpinnings of an antitrust violation. 45 For this rea-
son, the essential facility doctrine's monopoly power requirement
should be a fundamental prerequisite to establishing antitrust liability.
38. Id.
39. See, e.g., Tarabishi v. McAlester Regional Hosp., 951 F.2d 1558, 1568 n.14 (10th Cir.
1991) (no showing that hospital or physicians were monopolists), cert. denied, -U.S. __,
112 S. Ct. 2996 (1992).
40. See, e.g., Consul, Ltd. v. Transco Energy Co., 805 F.2d 490 (4th Cir. 1986), cert. de-
nied, 481 U.S. 1050 (1987).
41. 805 F.2d 490 (4th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1050 (1987).
42. Id. at 493.
43. Id. at 494-96.
44. See, e.g., Beverage Management, Inc. v. Coca-Cola Bottling Corp., 653 F. Supp. 1144,
1156 (S.D. Ohio 1986) (control of essential facility by a business or group of business).
45. Spectrum Sports v. McQuillan, -U.S. -_, 113 S. Ct. 884 (1993).
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Despite some judicial confusion regarding the proper analytical
technique for demonstrating monopoly power in essential facility
cases, most courts and commentators form a consensus supporting the
traditional market share approach. Under this well-developed and
straightforward methodology, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the
defendant has monopoly power 'in a relevant product and geographic
market or submarket." Monopoly power is a function of the defen-
dant's market share in the relevant geographic and product (or serv-
ice) market, evidence of entry or exit barriers, and other factors such
as the existence of government regulations. In essential facility cases,
this market analysis focuses on defining the parameters of the relevant
product (or service) and geographic markets that include the alleged
"essential facility."
The "essential facility" plaintiff must also establish that the defen-
dant has "control" over the facility from which the plaintiff is denied
access.17 This element is easily satisfied where the defendant has actual
ownership of the facility. In other situations, however, defendants
may not have sufficient control to meet this requirement. For exam-
ple, one of a number of defendants who collectively control access to
a facility may not individually have "control" over the facility. In-
stead, one defendant may merely contribute to the denial of plaintiff's
access to the facility.4" In these situations, an essential facility claim
may be brought only against the party who can ultimately provide ac-
cess to the facility. 4
9
In the health care context, excluded physicians often assert that a
number of defendants prevented the physicians from acquiring access
to an alleged essential facility (e.g., staff privileges).50 Under the the-
ory that "control" means that each defendant must directly control
access, competing physicians who individually do not control "ac-
cess" may not be subject to antitrust liability. The hospital that actu-
ally controls access to staff privileges would be the proper defendant.'
46. E. THOMAS SULLIVAN & JEFFREY L. HARRISON, UNDERSTANDING ANTITRUST AND ITS Ec-
ONOMIC IMPLICATIONS § 6.04, at 219-29 (1988).
47. See, e.g., MCI Communications v. American Tel. & Tel., 708 F.2d 1081, 1132 (7th Cir.
1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 891 (1983).
48. See, e.g., United States Football League v. National Football League, 842 F.2d 1335
(2d Cir. 1988).
49. See, e.g., Beverage Management, Inc. v. Coca-Cola Bottling Corp., 653 F. Supp. 1144,
1157 (S.D. Ohio 1986) (defendant beverage company does not control grocer's feature ads which
competing beverage distributor alleged were essential facilities).
50. See, e.g., Pontius v. Children's Hospital, 552 F. Supp. 1352 (W.D. Pa. 1982).
51. The question whether members of a hospital's staff can conspire with the hospital to
unlawfully deny staff privileges is unresolved as indicated by the split among the courts that have
considered the issue. Compare Nurse Midwifery Assocs. v. Hibbett, 918 F.2d 605 (6th Cir. 1990)
1994]
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2. Essentiality, Inability to Practically or Reasonably Duplicate
the Facility, and Feasibility of Access
The essential facility test also requires that the facility at issue be
"essential," that it cannot be reasonably or practically duplicated,
and that access to it is economically feasible. This Article considers
these requirements collectively because they are all indicia of the de-
gree to which a defendant has economic power through its control of
the "essential facility." No bright line tests exist and none of these
elements alone establishes the requisite economic power in the essen-
tial facility. Instead, these factors seem to merely rephrase the monop-
oly power requirement in different terms. The elements also seek to
answer the question why others cannot replicate the facility them-
selves.
The first part of the test requires a showing that a facility owner
controls a resource that is "essential." Little coherent judicial guid-
ance exists as to what "essential" means. Certainly, a monopolized
resource is more likely to be "essential" in some respects than a non-
monopolized resource. But courts have yet to equate "essential" facil-
ity and "monopolized" facility. Instead, a few courts have said that
to be essential "it is sufficient if duplication of the facility would be
economically infeasible and if denial of its use inflicts a severe handi-
cap on potential market entrants.'"'5 This formulation, however,
seems to merely make the "inability to practicably duplicate" element
a means of concurrently establishing the "essentiality" element.
Equating "inability to practicably duplicate" with "essentiality" can
unjustifiably infer that an existing facility is "essential" simply be-
cause one competitor cannot "practicably" duplicate it.
Some courts have identified factors that indicate a facility is not
essential. For example, a facility is not essential merely because it is
better than or preferable to another.5 1 Similarly, facilities that compet-
itors can "practicably" or "reasonably" duplicate are not essential.5 4
These factors, however, provide little additional objective guidance
such that the concept of "essentiality" remains somewhat open-ended
and thereby provides courts with considerable discretion in its inter-
pretation and application.
(hospital and medical staff cannot conspire), modified, 927 F.2d 904 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, -
U.S. -, 112 S. Ct. 406 (1991) with Bolt v. Halifax Hosp. Medical Ctr., 891 F.2d 810 (11th
Cir. 1990) (hospital and staff can conspire), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 924 (1990), appeal after re-
mand, 980 F.2d 1381 (11th Cir. 1993).
52. See Fishman v. Estate of Wirtz, 807 F.2d 520, 539 (7th Cir. 1986); see also Hecht v.
Pro-Football, Inc., 570 F.2d 982, 992 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 956 (1978).
53. See, e.g., Fishman, 807 F.2d at 539.
54. See, e.g., Hecht, 570 F.2d at 992.
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The fourth part of the test, the economic feasibility of access, refers
to whether the facility's owner can share the facility without interfer-
ing with or depleting its own use of the facility, without causing con-
gestion of the facility, and without incurring economic losses. 5
Mandated access, requiring the owner to share its resources, may in-
hibit the owner's ability to serve its own customers or meet its own
demands for the resources. For this reason, courts must consider the
economic justifications of owners of essential facilities who include
rivals. For example, simply because a firm has excess capacity56 does
not mean it must share it with rivals if access would result in conges-
tion, overuse or depletion of the resource. Similarly, firms that main-
tain an inventory of a purported "essential" resource should not have
to make it available for consumption by others if they can demon-
strate a valid "business justification.' 57
3. Denial of Access to, or Use of, the Essential Facility
The essential facility test requires that the owner deny the plaintiff
access to, or use of, the facility." This element parallels the exclusion-
ary conduct requirement in monopolization actions. Under monopoli-
zation law, however, a refusal to deal or a denial of access is generally
not actionable if made unilaterally as an independent business judg-
ment.59 For this reason, the essential facility doctrine imposes greater
obligations on owners of "essential facilities" than are generally im-
posed under other antitrust principles.
In the essential facility context, the term "access" means more than
merely the right of access or admission to a facility. Instead, it means
actual use and depletion of the facility (i.e. sharing and allocating the
55. See, e.g., MCI Communications v. American Tel. & Tel., 708 F.2d 1081, 1132 (7th Cir.
1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 891 (1983); Hecht v. Pro-Football, Inc., 570 F.2d 982, 992-93
(D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 956 (1978); Gamco, Inc. v. Providence Fruit & Produce
Bldg., Inc., 194 F.2d 484, 487 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 817 (1952).
56. The term "excess capacity" has both a rigorous and a common economic meaning.
Rigorously defined, a firm is said to be producing with excess capacity if its output
level is below that at which average costs are at a minimum. The more common usage
refers to firms operating plant at a rate of utilization below that considered normal
(e.g. at some percentage level of output that could be achieved).
THE MIT DICTIONARY OF MODERN ECONOMICS 137 (3d ed. 1986).
57. This point is discussed infra in text accompanying notes 66-70.
58. See generally A. D. NEALE & D. G. GoDER, THE ANTITRUST LAWS OF TmE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA 59 (3d ed. 1980) ("where facilities cannot practicably be duplicated by
would-be competitors, those in possession of them must allow them to be shared on fair-terms"
(emphasis added)).
59. Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationary & Printing Co., 472 U.S.
284, 600-01 (1985).
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scarce resource among rivals).6° This distinction proves important be-
cause a connotation underlying a firm's refusal to grant "access" is
that the firm acts unreasonably in doing so (perhaps because of an
implicit assumption that the resource is abundant). Put in proper eco-
nomic context, a firm's decision not to share or allow the use of its
own resources with its business rivals has a less negative connotation
and makes explicit that even purported essential facilities are resources
subject to scarcity constraints.
The phrase "denial of access" is a term of art which can occur in a
number of ways, some of which are innocuous. For example, a firm
that refuses to even engage in negotiations with a competitor for use
of a resource thereby denies that competitor access to the resource.
This denial may have no anticompetitive effect even if the firm has
some degree of market power. 61 Some "denials of access" may also be
justified based on scarcity. For example, a hospital may have a legiti-
mate justification for limiting the number of physicians and non-phy-
sician professionals that have access to and use of its facilities. Denial
of access in this context may have no meaningful economic ramifica-
tions.
A firm's unreasonable offer of access, however, can amount to a
"denial" in some situations. For instance, if a defendant offers to
provide its facility to the plaintiff at a price later determined to be
unreasonable, a denial of access can occur.
62
Finally, the subjective motivations of owners of essential facilities
who deny access appear to be irrelevant. Most essential facility cases
set forth a multipart test that does include as one of its element that a
denial of access be with "exclusionary intent. ' 63 For this reason, a
60. See NEALE & GOYDER supra note 58, at 59.
61. For example, in Ferguson v. Greater Pocatello Chamber of Commerce, 848 F.2d 976
(9th Cir. 1988), an owner of an auditorium limited the number of trade shows in its facility per
season and chose only one of a number of competing bidders. The court held that this conduct
was not an unlawful denial and that it merely promoted competition for the use of the facility.
848 F.2d at 983. The court stated that "[the defendant] has not refused to deal with anyone. It
has merely refused to house more than one trade show per spring, and it has decided that that
show will be given to the producer who makes the best bid. The [plaintiffs] simply failed to
outbid their competitors." Id..
62. See, e.g., Aspen Skiing Co., 472 U.S. 585, 591-592 (1985) (defendant ski company of-
fered plaintiff 12.5% share of joint revenues compared to past minimum of 13.2%); Consoli-
dated Gas Co. of Fla. v. City Gas. Co. of Fla., 665 F. Supp. 1493, 1534 (S.D. Fla. 1987) (offers
for natural gas at seven cents per therm over cost held unreasonable when estimates of reasona-
ble price were approximately one cent per therm), aff'd, 880 F.2d 297 (11 th Cir. 1989), vacated,
889 F.2d 264 (l1th Cir. 1990), on rehearing en banc, 912 F.2d 1262 (lth Cir. 1990), cert.
granted and judgment vacated, 499 U.S. 915, (1991). In Aspen Skiing Co., for instance, it was
necessary to consider the plaintiff's contribution to the joint marketing venture and its subse-
quent market share to determine the reasonableness of the defendant's offer. 472 U.S. 585, 587.
63. See supra notes 32-34 and the cases cited therein.
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firm that lacks anticompetitive motivation but nonetheless denies its
rivals use of its facilities may violate the essential facility doctrine and
be subject to antitrust liability.
4. Business Justification Defense
Courts have recognized a business justification defense to the essen-
tial facility doctrine.64 The defense is consistent with the proposition
that a firm possessing monopoly power is not automatically subject to
antitrust liability because monopoly power may result from "superior
skill, foresight and industry"6 5 or "superior product, business acu-
men, or historic accident."66
A denial of access is justified where the defendant has a legitimate
business reason for the denial.6 7 For instance, the feasibility of access
element raises the question of whether access would overburden the
facility, causing the defendant's level of customer service to decline.6
A denial of access is permissible if access would prevent the owner
from serving its own customers or would interfere with the owner's
expansion plans. 69
The defendant can also demonstrate that a denial is based on eco-
nomic efficiency considerations. A firm defending against an essential
facility claim can demonstrate that the net effects of denying access
are pro-competitive (i.e., economic benefits outweigh any economic
costs). 70 A common example involves an essential facility action
against a vertically integrated firm that controls some scarce or "es-
sential" resource that its rivals demand. 7 The excluded rivals' claim is
that the firm uses its monopoly power in the resource to extend or
leverage such power into another level of production or distribution
thereby foreclosing competition. This leveraging theory asserts that
the vertically integrated firm creates a barrier to entry (i.e., the so-
64. See generally Areeda, supra note 6, at 847-52 (stating that "denial of access is never per
se unlawful; legitimate business purpose always saves the defendant."); Werden, supra note 6, at
457-58 (noting that some, but not all, courts have recognized such a defense).
65. United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 430 (2d Cir. 1945).
66. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 571 (1966).
67. See Areeda, supra note 6, at 849-52 (discussing "micro level" business justifications
and "macro level" business justifications; the former focus on the circumstances of a particular
case, while the latter focus on general economic policy considerations).
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. See generally Laraine L. Laudati, Note, Economies of Scale: Weighing Operating Effi-
ciency When Enforcing Antitrust Law, 49 FoRDLtm L. REV. 771 (1981) (arguing that scale econ-
omies should be considered in determining liability and relief under section 2 of the Sherman
Act).
71. See, e.g., Fishman v. Estate of Wirt2, 807 F.2d 520, 540 (7th Cir. 1986).
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called "bottleneck"). This bottleneck requires that rivals enter at
more than one level of distribution or production simultaneously in
order to compete against the vertically integrated firm.12
Courts have relied on this leveraging concept to hold that a verti-
cally integrated monopolist's refusal to provide access to its scarce re-
source at one level of production is unlawful because the monopolist
can thereby extend its economic power into other stages of production
or markets. 7 This leveraging theory, however, is subject to considera-
ble dispute and is discredited by many antitrust scholars. 4
In fact, there are a number of reasons why firms vertically inte-
grate, many of which have little to do with the abusive use of monop-
oly power.7 A firm may vertically integrate to internalize a
transaction in which the firm previously engaged in with outside sup-
pliers. By acquiring its own supply source, the firm avoids the costs of
transacting in the market. These cost savings may alter the firm's mix
of inputs and result in greater production efficiencies. Vertical inte-
gration can also achieve cost savings when a firm that monopolizes an
input vertically integrates "downstream" (i.e., forward in the produc-
tion process) with a firm whose production technology enables a more
commercial use of the input. 7
6
Vertical integration also occurs due to the uncertainty of input
prices. 77 This uncertainty creates an incentive for risk-averse firms to
vertically integrate into the production of the input. By producing and
warehousing its own supply of the input, the firm can insulate itself to
some extent from market price fluctuations. This strategy, however, is
limited by the storability of the input, costs of storage, and the oppor-
tunity costs of other investments. Consequently, firms can use vertical
integration to enhance the economic stability of their production proc-
esses. Because of the economically justifiable results of vertical inte-
gration, courts should generally be unwilling to require firms to share
72. Id. at 540 ("The point of the essential facilities doctrine is that a potential market en-
trant should not be forced simultaneously to enter a second market, with its own large capital
requirement.").
73. See id. at 539; MCI Communications v. American Tel. & Tel., 708 F.2d 1081, 1132 (7th
Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 891 (1983).
74. See BORK, supra note 23, at 372-81; Ward S. Bowman, Jr. Tying Arrangements and the
Leverage Problem, 67 YALE L.J. 19 (1957). But see Louis Kaplow, Extension of Monopoly
Power Through Leverage, 85 CoLum. L. REV. 515 (1985).
75. Much of this section relies upon ROGER D. BLAIR & DAVID L. KASERMAN, LAW AND
ECONOhUCS OF VERTICAL INTEGRATION AND CONTROL (1983). See also John M. Vernon & Daniel
A. Graham, Profitability of Monopolization by Vertical Integration, 78 J. POL. ECON. 924
(1971); Meyer L. Burstein, A Theory of Full-Line Forcing, 55 Nw. U. L. REv. 62 (1960).
76. This concept, termed variable input proportions production, is explained in ROcER D.
BLAIR & DAVID L. KASERMAN, ANTITRUST EcoNoMIcs 302-04 (1983).
77. BLAIR & KASERMAN, supra note 75, at 83-109.
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such internal benefits with rivals unless no alternative means of pro-
moting competition exist.7"
I. ESSENTIAL FACILITY CASES: HEALTH CARE CONTEXT
Essential facility claims in the health care industry have an intuitive
appeal because of the notion that health care services are "essential"
to individual well-being. That health care services may be essential to
good health, however, does not mean that particular health care facili-
ties or resources are necessarily "essential" in an antitrust sense.
Despite the recent proliferation of antitrust actions claiming denials
of access to "essential" health care facilities, courts generally reject
the doctrine's application to the various facilities alleged to be "essen-
tial," although there are some exceptions.79 These claims have in-
volved attempts to access hospitals and other medical buildings,
medical staff privileges, and durable medical equipment (DME) refer-
rals. Only claims involving DME have had success.8 0 As the next sec-
tion discusses, most of the health care facilities at issue in these cases
have not exhibited the characteristics of essential facilities.
A. Hospitals and Medical Office Buildings as Essential Facilities
1. Hospital Facilities and Equipment
A number of antitrust plaintiffs have claimed that a hospital and its
departments, emergency units, or equipment are essential facilities.81
Courts, however, are generally skeptical of such claims and have al-
most uniformly rejected them, particularly where there is evidence
that persons excluded continue to make substantial incomes despite
being denied access.8 2 The courts question whether a facility can be
78. Areeda, supra note 6, at 852 ("There is no general duty to share. Compulsory access, if
it exists at all, is and should be very exceptional.").
79. See, e.g., Advanced Health-Care Services, Inc. v. Radford Community Hospital, 910
F.2d 139 (4th Cir. 1990); Key Enterprises v. Venice Hospital, 919 F.2d 1550 (lth Cir. 1990),
reh'g granted and opinion vacated, 979 F.2d 806 (lth Cir. 1992) (en banc), appeal dismissed
and judgment vacated, 9 F.3d 893 (1 1th Cir. 1993) (en banc). See also M & M Medical Supplies
& Serv. v. Pleasant Valley Hosp., Inc., 1992-2 Trade Cases. (CCH) 70,059 (4th Cir. 1992) (en
banc) (essential facility claim involved but not explicitly discussed).
80. Id.
81. See, e.g., McKenzie v. Mercy Hospital, 854 F.2d 365 (10th Cir. 1988); Smith v. North-
ern Michigan Hospital, Inc., 703 F.2d 942 (6th Cir. 1983); Konik v. Champlain Valley Physi-
cians Hospital Medical Center, 561 F. Supp. 700 (N.D.N.Y. 1983), aff'd, 733 F.2d 1007 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 884 (1984).
82. See infra text accompanying notes 123-26.
19941
928 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW [Vol. 21:913
"essential" to competition if economic rivals continue to prosper
without access.83
In general, access to a hospital's facilities has become increasingly
difficult.8 The growth in the number of physicians contrasts sharply
with the decline in the number of hospitals and available hospital
beds.85 Consequently, physicians and non-physician practitioners gen-
erally have fewer readily available facilities in which to practice. Also,
the contemporary legal trend is to treat hospitals, rather than physi-
cians, as primary providers of health care services.8 6 Hospitals, there-
fore, have the duty to use reasonable care in their selection and
oversight of their staffs.87 In response to lawsuits alleging that the hos-
pitals acted negligently in their review or retention of unqualified or
inadequate physician staffs, hospitals have used more restrictive eval-
uation mechanisms to avoid such liability, further restricting access.
In addition, the expansion of the antitrust laws to health care provi-
ders places additional constraints on hospital selection and retention
procedures. The excluded physician or non-physician practitioner will
often urge that a hospital's decision to close or limit its staff is a con-
certed effort with competing physicians or non-physician practitioners
to reduce competition rather than to increase the quality of service.
Hospitals have a number of legitimate economic and administrative
reasons for limiting access to their facilities. Limited access reduces
the administrative burden of maintaining and monitoring the compe-
tence of the medical staff. The hospital's increased control reduces the
potential for mistakes and malpractice exposure. 8 Administrative effi-
83. Id.
84. The three categories of hospital privileges are (1) medical staff membership (generally
medical physicians); (2) limited practitioner with clinical privileges (practitioners who must have
the permission of the medical staff before admitting, treating, or discharging patients); and (3)
specified professional personnel (non-physicians who use hospital facilities but may not admit
patients). Stephen E. Nagin, Litigation of Hospital Staff Privileges, FLA. B.J. 183, Mar. 1984, at
183-84.
85. In the period from 1960 to 1985, the number of physicians per 100,000 population in-
creased from 141 to 204. During the period 1980 to 1985, however, over 270 hospitals closed
resulting in a decline of almost 44,000 beds. See Alvin R. Tarlov, The Increasing Supply of
Physicians, the Changing Structure of the Ifealth Services System, and the Future Practice of
Medicine, 308 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1235, 1238 (Shattuck lecture presented to the 202d Annual
Meeting at the Massachusetts Medical Society, May 18, 1983).
86. See William R. Drexel, The Antitrust Implications of the Denial of Hospital Staff Privi-
leges, 36'U. Mtmam L. Rv. 207, 207-08 (1982). The seminal case which established hospital
corporate liability is Darling v. Charleston Community Memorial Hosp., 211 N.E.2d 253 (Ill.
1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 946 (1966).
87. See generally Thomas Katheder, The Medical Staff Privileges Problem in Florida, 12
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 339, 341 n.14 (1984) (detailing development of hospital's duty to patients
under respondeat superior and deep pocket theories).
88. Nagin, supra note 84, at 184.
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ciency is also enhanced through the reduction of costs, as well as the
variability of costs associated with staff scheduling and equipment
maintenance. This rationale roughly parallels the business justification
and denial of access elements of the essential facility doctrine. For
instance, a hospital may "deny access" because the administrative
costs of scheduling and monitoring additional physicians' use of its
facility outweigh any resulting benefits.
An initial question in hospital "essential facility" cases is whether a
plaintiff can demonstrate that a hospital has sufficient economic
power in its challenged facility to enable it to successfully engage in
anticompetitive conduct. Determining whether a hospital has monop-
oly power in a relevant product and geographic market (or submarket)
is a difficult economic question. Courts have taken a relatively prag-
matic approach by determining a relevant product market generally
under a so-called "cluster approach." 89 This approach determines
whether a cluster of services that hospitals offer constitutes a relevant
product market. 90 The rationale is that hospitals provide a bundle of
complementary services that provide patients and physicians with full
service health care. 9' Hospitals provide such services, in part, due to
the economies of scale and scope that result. Under the cluster ap-
proach, the relevant product market is an array of health care services
that provides additional benefits to patients and health care suppliers
beyond those benefits that each service individually provides.
A criticism of the cluster approach is that it excludes hospital com-
petitors who provide one or more, but not all, of the cluster services.
For example, freestanding surgical and emergency care units do not
89. Milton L. Cruz, Product and Geographical Market Measurements in the Merger of
Hospitals, 91 DICK. L. REV. 497, 508 (1986). Other methods of defining the relevant product
market are possible, such as reliance on the existence or organization of diagnostic related
groups (DRGs). See, e.g., Loiterman v. Antani, No. 90-C-0983, 1991 WL 117209 (N.D. Ill. fune
25, 1991) (summary judgment inappropriate because parties disagreed on factual issue whether
product market consisted of five or twelve DRGs).
90. See, e.g., In re American Medical Int'l., 104 F.T.C. 177, 194 (1984) (defining relevant
product market as the cluster of general acute care hospital services).
91. In American Medical, the Federal Trade Commission stated:
Although each individual service that comprises the cluster of general acute care hos-
pital services may well have outpatient substitutes, the benefit that accrues to patient
and physician is derived from their complementarity. There is no readily available
substitute supplier of the benefit that this complementarity confers on patient and
physician.
Id. at 194. In addition to considering the uniqueness of the cluster of services provided by the
general acute care hospital, the Commission considered also the following factors in determining
the relevant product market: (1) the uniqueness of the individual services and equipment pro-
vided; (2) the low cross-elasticity of supply; and (3) recognition that general acute care hospitals
comprised a separate market. Id. at 193.
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provide the cluster of services hospitals provide. 92 Yet these units com-
pete directly with hospitals for surgical and emergency care patients.
The product market under the cluster approach therefore may be too
narrow and may provide an inaccurate measure of the actual competi-
tive environment.
93
The determination of the relevant geographic market entails analyz-
ing from which geographic areas hospitals draw their patients. 94 This
approach generally relies upon patient inflow and outmigration statis-
tics. 9 The patient inflow statistic measures the percentage of patients.
from outside a particular area who come to the hospital within the
area.6 The patient outmigration statistic measures the percentage of
patients from a particular area that use hospital services outside the
area. 97 If both the inflow and outmigration statistics are low, the par-
ticular geographic area is probably the relevant market. 9 If both sta-
tistics are high, the geographical market should be enlarged. 99
The court's market analysis in Robinson v. Magovern'00 is instruc-
tive. A thoracic surgeon sued the hospital and staff members for de-
nial of staff privileges. The court accepted the surgeon's contention
that the relevant product market was "adult open heart surgery" be-
cause "no substitute for the product exists and because high entry
barriers prevent most surgeons from becoming suppliers of open heart
procedures." 01
The surgeon urged the court to adopt a narrow two-county geo-
graphic market and the defendant-hospital urged a broader national
92. Cruz, supira note 89, at 513.
93. Some states, however, mandate that hospitals provide a cluster of health care services.
Id. In these states, the cluster approach provides a more accurate product market description
because most non-hospital service providers will not offer all the services the state mandates. Id.
94. In United States v. Philadelphia National Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 359 (1963) the Supreme
Court stated that the relevant geographical market is that area "in which the seller operates, and
to which the purchaser can practicably turn for supplies." (emphasis and citations omitted). The
inquiry, therefore, requires a methodology for determining the predominant geographic area in
which hospitals compete for patients.
95. See generally Kenneth G. Elzinga & Thomas F. Hogarty, The Problem of Geographic
Market Delineation in Antitrust Suits, 18 ANTITRUST BULL. 45 (1973); see also Roger D. Blair &
James M. Fesmire, Antitrust Treatment of Hospital Mergers, 2 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL'y 25,
49 (1988-89).
96. Blair & Fesmire, supra note 95 at 45-50.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. 521 F. Supp. 842 (W.D. Pa. 1981), aff'd, 688 F.2d 824 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S.
971 (1982).
101. Id. at 878. The court noted the small elasticity of substitution between open heart sur-
gery and patients' other alternatives by stating "[a) candidate for open heart surgery has no real
choice." Id. In addition, the court determined that pediatric open heart surgery was a distinct
product market because of the specialized procedures and equipment it requires. Id.
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market. The court, however, rejected both parties' definitions and
found that the relevant geographic market consisted of an intermedi-
ate sixteen-county area. 02 The court determined that a high percent-
age of open-heart surgery patients chose to have surgery in a hospital
within the sixteen-county market.103 The court further noted that al-
most all of the sixteen counties were represented at the six open heart
hospitals in the market. 1°4 Although a high percentage of residents
within the two-county area underwent open heart surgery at hospitals
within that area, the court noted that hospitals within the two-county
area had a fifty percent market share of residents from the remaining
fourteen counties. 105 This evidence demonstrated that a two-county
market was too narrow.
Some courts take a less rigorous approach in determining the rele-
vant geographic market. For instance, in Mandava v. Howard County
General Hospital, Inc.,'06 an anesthesiologist claimed antitrust viola-
tions against a hospital and staff for termination of his staff privi-
leges. The defendants moved to dismiss the antitrust claims based on
the hospital's lack of monopoly or market power in a relevant market
and the hospital not being essential for the provision of anesthesiolog-
ical services. 0 7 The anesthesiologist argued that because the hospital
was the only acute care hospital in the county at issue, the county
itself was the relevant geographic market.10 8
The court agreed with the Co.urt of Special Appeals of Maryland
which, in deciding an identical case brought by the same plaintiff,
stated that "the relevant market must correspond to commercial reali-
ties and commercial realities are defined by proximity."' 9 The court
therefore rejected the one-county market definition because "at least
seven other hospitals are within twenty miles or thirty driving [sic]
minutes driving time of the [h]ospital." 0 The court also noted that
there was no evidence that the defendants did anything to prevent the
anesthesiologist from practicing at these other hospitals.'" Because
the one-county market definition was too narrow and failed to ac-
102. Id. at 881.
103. Id. at 885.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 884.
106. 1992-2 Trade Cases. (CCH) 69,932 (D. Md. 1992).
107. Id. at 68,467.
108. Id.
109. Id. (citing V. Rao Mandoava, No. 1167, slip op. at 18).
110. Id.
111. Id.
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count for the "realities of [c]ompetition," the court dismissed the
anesthesiologist's monopolization and essential facility claims." 2
The methodology the court in Mandava used in reaching its conclu-
sions regarding the relevant geographic market is less precise than the
use of in patient inflow and outmigration statistics." 3 For instance, if
it were determined that the inflow and outmigration statistics for pa-
tients at the hospital at issue in Mandava were low (based on a one-
county geographic market), the court's conclusions regarding the rele-
vant geographic market would be erroneous. Although the court was
correct in recognizing that the geographic proximity of other hospitals
is a relevant factor, the inflow and outmigration statistics are a better
means of assessing relevant markets in antitrust cases.
With these market analyses in mind, a few illustrations show how
some courts have analyzed hospital essential facility cases. In Mc-
Kenzie v. Mercy Hospital,"4 a short-term general care hospital, Mercy
Hospital, was the only hospital in Independence, Kansas, and one of
only three hospitals in the surrounding county." 5 McKenzie, a physi-
cian, was granted staff privileges at Mercy Hospital from 1978 until
late 1982 when the hospital's board voted not to renew his privileges
based on their finding that he had violated hospital and medical staff
bylaws and had engaged in unprofessional, disruptive conduct." 6 The
physician alleged that the refusal to renew his staff privileges consti-
tuted, in part, a violation of the essential facility doctrine." 7
The trial court held that the physician failed to establish the ele-
ments of the essential facility claim because he could not demonstrate
that he and the hospital were competitors and even if he and Mercy
"did compete in the physician services market, the facilities of Mercy
Hospital were not essential to [the physician's] practice of providing
non-emergency care."" 8 Notably, the physician's definition of the
purported "essential facility" changed during the course of litigation
from the entire hospital to the hospital's obstetrical care and emer-
gency care units, and later to the hospital's emergency room."19
112. Id. The court also found that the anesthesiologist failed to state antitrust claims due to
the lack of antitrust injury (i.e., a lessening of competition in a particular market). Id.
113. Other courts have used a similar approach. See, e.g., Malini v. Singleton & Assoc.,
1988-2 Trade Cases. (CCH) 68,250 at 59,554 (1988), (S.D. Tex. 1988) (plaintiff's market defi-
nition ignores "the obvious existence of competition from the non-traditional hospitals" that
compete directly in the immediate geographic area).
114. 854 F.2d 365 (10th Cir. 1988).
115. Id. at 366 n.l. Mercy Hospital was a non-stock, non-profit corporation wholly owned
by an order of the Roman Catholic Church at the time the lawsuit was filed. Id.
116. Id. at 366.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 367 (citing the record of the lower court).
119. Id. at 369-70.
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The appellate court accepted the assertion that the essential facilities
at issue consisted of both the emergency room and the obstetrical care
unit.12o The court also accepted the physician's assertion that the phy-
sician and the hospital were competitors because they offered similar
services.' 2'
In addressing the essential facility issue, the appellate court ex-
plained that the doctrine prohibits certain refusals to deal that are part
of "a vertical integration scheme calculated to drive a competitor out
of business.' 1 2 In reaching its conclusion that the facilities at issue
were not "essential," the court relied to a great extent on evidence the
physician presented. One of the physician's legal memoranda stated:
Doctor McKenzie has a substantial obstetrical care practice and in
fact delivers infants in his office in Independence. To the extent that
Dr. McKenzie does not admit these obstetrical patients to Mercy
Hospital, Mercy Hospital is denied a market for the provision of
hospital facilities to those patients. This is direct and immediate
competition. In addition, it is indisputable that Dr. McKenzie at one
time had a substantial emergency room practice. Since most
emergency room visits are not in fact true emergencies, Dr.
McKenzie is still competing with the emergency room to the extent
that many of those patients could be treated by Dr. McKenzie in his
clinic. If they were to choose to go to Dr. McKenzie, instead of
Mercy Hospital's emergency room, Dr. McKenzie would have the
benefit of supplying them with ancillary services and supplies.2'1
The court relied upon this evidence to support its conclusion that the
emergency room and the obstetrical care unit were not essential to the
physician's practice. 2 4 Instead, the evidence demonstrated that the
physician had a substantial and growing obstetrical care practice and
continued to compete with the hospital's emergency room even after
losing his staff privileges.' 5 The court, therefore, concluded that the
physician's essential facility claim failed. 26
120. Id.
121. Id. at 370-71.
122. Id. at 368.
123. Id. at 370.
124. Id. at 371.
125. Id. at 371 n.l1.
126. Id. at 371. The court decided not to reach the question whether the essential facility
doctrine should apply to hospital staff privilege decisions. The court stated that
"[w]hether the doctrine's per se rule ought to condemn termination of a physician's
privileges is a question that must be answered only when all four criteria of the Hecht/
MCI formula are satisfied. Because we conclude that Dr. McKenzie has failed to show
that he was denied access to an essential facility, we do not address that. question in
this opinion."
Id. at 371 n. 12 (emphasis omitted).
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The court's conclusion is consistent with economic analysis. The
physician did not demonstrate that the hospital's emergency room and
the obstetrical care unit were "essential," constituted a natural mo-
nopoly, or created significant barriers to competition. Nor did the
physician demonstrate significant accessible economies of scale. In-
stead, the evidence demonstrated that the physician continued to prof-
itably provide services without the use of the hospital's facilities.
While the physician's practice might have been more comprehensive
and lucrative with access to the emergency room, the purpose of the
essential facility doctrine is not to maximize the physician's income or
protect the physician from competition. The court's refusal to grant
access, therefore, was justifiable.
Essential facility claims are sometimes cast as "tying claims" where
physicians are denied privileges because of existing exclusive agree-
ments with other physicians. The excluded physicians may claim that
such an agreement unlawfully "ties" the exclusive services to the es-
sential facility, the hospital and its equipment. 27 For example, in
Konik v. Champlain Valley Physicians Hospital Medical Center,28 an
anesthesiologist brought an antitrust action against a hospital and a
professional anesthesiology corporation. The physician, a hospital
staff member for twenty-two years, withdrew from an anesthesia
group practice that had entered a formal exclusive contract with the
hospital. " 9 The hospital removed the physician from her anesthesia
rotation schedule shortly thereafter. 30
The physician alleged that the hospital constituted an essential facil-
ity because it was the only major medical facility that operated contin-
uously and provided anesthesia services in a three-county area. 3' The
hospital was also the area's only referral hospital and teaching institu-
tion and was unequaled in both reputation and staff expertise.3 2 The
trial court, however, denied the physician's motion for summary judg-
ment on the essential facility claim. 33 The court applied the essential
127. In Mercy Hospital, the physician alleged an illegal tying arrangement under section I of
the Sherman Act (which requires collective action). Id. at 366 nn.3-4. The court rejected his
claim, however, because he did not demonstrate the hospital conspired with other persons or
entities to engage in the tie. The physician could have avoided this problem by alleging a tying
violation under section 2 of the Sherman Act, which applies to unilateral conduct.
128. 561 F. Supp. 700 (N.D.N.Y. 1983). aff'd, 733 F.2d 1007 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 469
U.S. 884 (1984).
129. Id. at 707.
130. Id.
131. The hospital contended that other hospitals in the three county area had similar facili-
ties. Id. at 719.
132. Id.
133. Id.
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facility test and stated that, even assuming the hospital was an essen-
tial facility, the physician had not established she was "unfairly de-
nied" use or that denial of access resulted in any severe economic
hardship.,3 The court noted that the physician "has worked, and can
continue to work, in other facilities."' 35 Finally, there may have been
other hospitals in the relevant geographic area that had successfully
duplicated the defendant-hospital's services thereby creating doubt re-
garding the physician's essential facility claim. 3 6
Again, the court's analysis is consistent with economic analysis. The
physician continued to prosper without access and evidence indicated
that others had replicated the purported "essential" facility.
One other case demonstrates judicial reluctance to embrace the doc-
trine as applied to hospitals. In Smith v. Northern Michigan Hospital,
Inc. ,1 7 the court rejected the application of the doctrine because of
the lack of a horizontal relationship between the defendants. A group
of physicians brought claims under sections one and two of the Sher-
man Act against a hospital and a clinic.' The physicians, who had
limited privileges at the hospital, alleged that the hospital's decision to
award the clinic an exclusive contract for the provision of emergency
room services was an unreasonable restraint of trade. 39
The physicians relied, in part, on the essential facility doctrine and
urged that the defendants were horizontal competitors whose joint
control over an essential facility resulted in an unreasonable restraint
of trade. 14 The court concluded, however, that the hospital was in a
vertical relationship with the clinic and had to staff its one emergency
room in the most "effective, efficient and medically prudent man-
ner.' ' 4' For this reason, the essential facility doctrine was inapplica-
ble.142 The court also found that the hospital had acted properly and
had not adopted the exclusive contract to force the physicians from
the market. 141
The court's conclusion is disputable because the court overlooked
the fact that the essential facility doctrine can apply to vertically-inte-
134. id. at 719, 724.
135. Id. at 724.
136. Id. at 719.
137. 703 F.2d 942 (6th Cir. 1983).
138. Id. at 945.
139. Id. at 946. The plaintiffs did not bid for the contract and were unwilling to provide the
full-time emergency room services the hospital had requested. Id. at 952-53.
140. Id. at 953.
141. Id.
142. id.
143. Id.
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grated firms or relationships that create "bottleneck" situations.' 44
The court nonetheless recognized that the contractual vertical integra-
tion between the hospital and clinic resulted in economic efficiencies
that might be eliminated if the excluded physicians were given manda-
tory access. 45 The court, however, did not consider whether these eco-
nomic efficiencies outweighed the benefits of providing access to the
alleged bottleneck. For this reason, further economic analysis was
warranted. The case nevertheless indicates the general unwillingness of
courts to impose the doctrine on hospitals.
2. Medical Office Buildings
Essential facility claims are not limited to medical facilities such as
hospitals. Some claims have alleged that office space in a medical of-
fice building is an essential facility for the provision of medical serv-
ices. For example, in Registered Physical Therapists, Inc. v.
Intermountain Health Care, Inc.,' 46 a group of physical therapists,
RPT, which provided out-patient physical therapy services at four lo-
cations, brought an antitrust action alleging they were denied access to
a new medical office building. 47 The primary defendant, IHC, owned
and operated hospitals in the relevant product and geographic markets
to which the parties had stipulated.
IHC had completed a new office building on a hospital campus and
entered a ground lease agreement with a limited partnership, MMB,
whereby it owned the land but MMB owned the building . 48 Soon af-
ter completion, RPT sought to lease space in the building but IHC
denied its request and leased the space to a competing back insti-
tute.149 IHC's lease with MMB contained a covenant preventing MMB
from leasing space to any other physical therapists.'50 Soon thereafter,
the hospital contracted out its in-house physical therapy work to a
joint venture that operated the back institute and was partially owned
by a physical therapist who competed with RPT.151
RPT claimed that its denial of space in the new medical office was
the product of concerted action to keep it from competing with the
144. Id. at 953; see supra notes 72-78 and accompanying text.
145. 703 F.2d at 953 ("NMH not only may, but also is obliged, to staff its limited facilities
in the manner which best serves the public interest. The evidence is overwhelming that it has
done just that.").
146. 1988-2 Trade Cases. (CCH) 68,233 (D. Utah 1988).
147. Id. at 59,483.
148. Id. at 59,482.
149. Id. at 59,482-83.
150. Id. at 59,483.
151. Id.
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back institute. 5 2 For purposes of analysis, the trial court assumed that
the alleged conspiracy existed and that its purpose was to exclude
competition from the new medical building. 53
RPT claimed that the new building was an essential facility because
it could not be reasonably duplicated by competitors and access was
necessary for RPT's competitive survival. 5 4 The court, however, held
that the facility failed to qualify on both counts.' 5 First, other suita-
ble office space was available within a half-mile of the building, and
space in the building could therefore be reasonably duplicated. 15 6 Sec-
ond, access to the building was not necessary for RPT to compete
because RPT and its physical therapists were already competing
"quite successfully" in the relevant market. 57 The court concluded
that the location of the building "was not essential to compete in the
relevant market, even if the relevant geographic market were limited
to the [building] and its immediate environs." 8
The court also analyzed RPT's claim under the rule of reason and
concluded that no injury to competition had been demonstrated. 5 9
RPT claimed that competition was hurt because the defendants al-
lowed only a single back facility in the building, precluded doctors
from using providers of their choice, and denied consumers a choice
of therapists. '0 The court concluded, however, that
any such limitations are not the result of the plaintiffs' exclusion
from the [building] but of their decision not to open a back clinic at
another location. The plaintiffs were free to open up a back clinic at
any of their existing locations along the Wasatch Front or to
establish a back clinic at a new location, including one in the vicinity
of [the hospital]. If consumers have been denied the benefits of new
technology it is because the plaintiffs elected not to introduce it, not
because they were denied access to the [building].' 6'
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 59,486-87.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 59,487. "In fact, they had four offices in the geographic market, none of which
was on a hospital campus or in an office tower adjoining or adjacent to a hospital. The only
evidence in the record suggests that whether a physical therapist had an office in the tower or
whether he had an office within half a mile of the tower made little difference in the referral
practices of a physician whose office was in the tower." Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
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The court further concluded that even if the relevant market was lim-
ited to the new building and its immediate surroundings, no evidence
of injury to competition existed. 62 In fact, the defendants' decision to
open a back clinic in the new building "actually increased competition
by adding a new competitor to the market."'' 63
In summary, these cases demonstrate that courts have been very
skeptical in their analysis of claims that a hospital or other medical
buildings are essential facilities. The courts have generally ruled that
such facilities are not essential in an antitrust sense. None of these
cases presented facts where an allegedly "essential" facility exhibited
the characteristics of a natural monopoly. The courts' analyses gener-
ally did not require significant analysis of vertical integration issues,
although one case based its conclusion on the benefits of contractual
vertical integration (without weighing such benefits against the bene-
fits of access).1 4 The courts have generally focused on factors that
indicate whether denials of access actually resulted in any competitive
harm. Because excluded physicians and others continued to compete
effectively against the hospitals and facilities from which they were
excluded, the courts concluded that no harm to the competitive proc-
ess resulted.
B. Staff Privileges As Essential Facilities
Physicians and non-physician professionals sometimes claim that
staff privileges or exclusive service contracts are essential facilities.
They assert that they are unable to compete without privileges or con-
tracts that permit access to such facilities. A number of courts, how-
ever, have rejected this position and have held that the staff privilege
relationship between physician and hospital is unique and not subject
to significant antitrust scrutiny. 65
In the oft-cited case, Pontius v. Children's Hospital,'6 the plaintiff
alleged that a hospital and other physicians conspired in violation of
162. Id.
163. Id. at 59,487-88. The court noted that the defendants' decision to keep RPT out of the
building "allowed [the] fledgling back clinic to grow to the point where it could compete effec-
tively." Id. at 59,488.
164. Smith v. Northern Michigan Hospital, Inc., 703 F.2d 942 (6th Cir. 1983).
165. See Tarabishi v. McAlester Regional Hosp., 951 F.2d 1558, 1568 n.14 (10th Cir. 1991)
(citing cases that have declared the essential facility doctrine inapplicable to staff privilege cases
for public policy reasons), cert. denied, __U.S. -, 112 S. Ct. 2996 (1992); Robles v. Hu-
mana Hosp. Cartersville, 785 F. Supp. 989, 995-96 (N.D. Ga. 1992) (access to hospital is neces-
sary for practice of obstetrics but "inappropriate" to apply doctrine that would prevent hospital
from keeping unqualified doctors off its staff).
' 166. 552 F. Supp. 1352 (W.D. Pa. 1982).
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the antitrust laws not to retain him as a cardiovascular physician on
the hospital's staff. The plaintiff asserted a per se essential facility
claim.167 The court, however, held that the essential facility doctrine is
inapplicable to hospital staff privileges decisions and entered judg-
ment for the defendants. '6 The court stated:
Even if we accept, without any evidence having been put forward,
the proposition that [the hospital's] thoracic and cardiovascular
surgical facilities may not practically be duplicated, we believe it
would be singularly inappropriate to apply a doctrine which would
prevent a hospital from keeping doctors it had adjudged unqualified
off of its staff. Neither public policy nor the Sherman Act can
countenance such a result. Consequently we now hold that the
essential facilities doctrine is inapplicable to hospital staff privileges
decisions. 1
69
The court's decision appears to be based entirely on its concern that
mandatory access under a per se essential facility test could prevent a
hospital from denying medical staff privileges to unqualified appli-
cants.
The court's lack of significant economic analysis in rendering this
public policy judgment is unfortunate. As discussed earlier in this Ar-
ticle, 170 the per se standard is inappropriate for essential facility analy-
sis. In some circumstances, staff privileges can exhibit the
characteristics of a natural monopoly such that exclusion would sig-
nificantly reduce competition. The court could have applied the doc-
trine, but ruled that either the facility could be replicated or that the
admission of an unqualified applicant would inhibit the hospital's
ability to service its customers adequately under the fourth part of the
essential facility test.'71
Some courts have recognized that denial of hospital staff privileges
can form the basis for an essential facility claim. 72 Nonetheless, a
greater number of courts have followed Pontius generally without sig-
nificant analysis of the claims presented or the economics of the al-
leged denial of access. For example, in Castelli v. Meadville Medical
Center,73 the court cited Pontius in support of its conclusion that the
167. Id. at 1367.
168. Id. at 1370.
169. Id. (emphasis added).
170. See supra notes 35-38 and accompanying text.
171. 552 F. Supp. at 1352.
172. See, e.g., Ahram v. Roxborough Mem. Hosp., 1991-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 69,528 (E.D.
Pa. 1991).
173. 702 F. Supp. 1201 (W.D. Pa. 1988), aff'd, 872 F.2d 411 (3d Cir. 1989).
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essential facility doctrine does not apply to "exclusive service con-
tracts by hospitals. 1 4 The court's conclusion was not as sweeping as
it might appear. The court further stated in dicta that "if there were a
case in which a hospital would be an essential facility, [the defendant]
would not be that hospital. Within a forty mile radius of [the defen-
dant-hospital], there are eight other hospitals at which Castelli poten-
tially could practice."' 75 The court, therefore, undertook some
economic analysis and concluded that the presence of a significant
number of competing facilities negated the essential facility claim pre-
sented.
C. Exclusive Durable Medical Equipment Supply Contracts As
Essential Facilities
The one type of essential facility claim that has had some success
relates to exclusive contracts and referral relationships that hospitals
enter into with suppliers of durable medical equipment and supplies
(DME)."76 Typical situations include a hospital entering into an exclu-
sive contract with a single supplier of DME or forming a joint venture
for this purpose. 17 Excluded suppliers, who may have previously sold
their products or services to the hospital's patients, claim that the ex-
clusive contract denies them access to an essential facility (i.e., the
market for DME to the hospital's patients). Hospitals counter that
exclusive contracts are justifiable business arrangements that increase
administrative convenience, reduce consumer confusion, and have lit-
tle or no anti-competitive consequences. 7
The court in Advanced Health-Care Services, Inc. v. Radford Com-
munity Hospital'7 was one of the first to recognize a DME essential
facility claim. AHCS, a provider of DME, claimed that three acute
care hospitals entered exclusive marketing arrangements with a com-
174. Id. at 1209.
175. Id.
176. The primary cases are Advanced Health-Care Services, Inc. v. Radford Community
Hospital, 910 F.2d 139 (4th Cir. 1990), and Key Enterprises v. Venice Hospital, 919 F.2d 1550
(11th Cir. 1990), reh'g granted and opinion vacated, 979 F.2d 806 (11th Cir. 1992) (en banc),
appeal dismissed and judgment vacated, 9 F.3d 893 (11 th Cir. 1993) (en banc); see also M & M
Medical Supplies & Serv. v. Pleasant Valley Hosp., Inc., 1992-2 Trade Cases. (CCH) 1 70,059
(4th Cir. 1992) (en banc) (not directly addressing essential facility claim).
177. William G. Kopit & Robert W. McCann, Old Wine in New Bottles: The Increased Anti-
trust Risk of Hospital Diversification, 26 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 601, 603-04 (1991).
178.. See Advanced Health-Care Services, Inc. v. Radford Community Hospital, 910 F.2d
139 (4th Cir. 1990); Key Enterprises v. Venice Hospital, 919 F.2d 1550 (lth Cir. 1990), reh'g
granted and opinion vacated, 979 F.2d 806 (1 1th Cir. 1992) (en banc), appeal dismissed and
judgment vacated, 9 F.3d 893 (11 th Cir. 1993) (en banc).
179. 910 F.2d 139 (4th Cir. 1990).
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peting DME supplier in return for a financial stake in DME sales.'8 0
AHCS claimed that two of the exclusive contracts violated the essen-
tial facility doctrine.' 8' The trial court, however, dismissed AHCS'
claim. 82
AHCS asserted that the essential facility was continued access to the
hospitals' patients for the purpose of selling DME.'83 AHCS alleged
that such access could not be duplicated and that the hospitals could
feasibly return to their prior practice of providing AHCS and others
access to their patients. 84 AHCS further claimed that the hospitals
could leverage their monopoly power in the provision of acute care
hospital services into the retail provision of DME to discharged pa-
tients.'8 5 AHCS contended that all DME dealers had equal ability to
provide their services to patients, physicians, and discharged person-
nel before the hospital entered into exclusive contracts. 
6
The appellate court held that AHCS met all the elements of an es-
sential facility claim.18 7 The court's decision hinged on its conclusion
that the hospitals' financial stakes in the sale of DME raised a factual
issue whether the hospitals were competitors with AHCS. 88 The court
therefore remanded to allow AHCS to proceed with its essential facil-
ity claims. The importance of the court's decision is that it recognized
the doctrine's application to exclusive DME contracts and provided
excluded DME providers with a recognized cause of action.
Essential facility claims arise where hospitals vertically integrate
into the provision of DME or enter joint ventures for the same pur-
pose. 89 For example, in Key Enterprises v. Venice Hospital, 19 an ex-
cluded supplier of DME successfully asserted antitrust claims against
a hospital that had formed a joint venture with a competing DME
company. The trial court, however, granted judgment notwithstand-
ing the verdict. A panel of the Eleventh Circuit reversed,' 9' but its
180. Id. at 142.
181. Id. at 142-43.
182. Id. at 143.
183. Id. at 142-43.
184. Id. at 150-51.
185. Id. at 149.
186. Id. at 150.
187. Id. at 151.
188. Id.
189. See also M & M Medical Supplies & Serv. v. Pleasant Valley Hosp., 1992-2 Trade Cases
70,059 (4th Cir. 1992); see generally Kopit & McCann, supra note 177 (arguing against applica-
tion of the essential facility doctrine to DME diversification).
190. 919 F.2d 1550 (1 th Cir. 1990), reh'g granted and opinion vacated, 979 F.2d 806 (1 1th
Cir. 1992) (en banc), appeal dismissed and judgment vacated, 9 F.3d 893 (11th Cir. 1993) (en
banc).
191. 919 F.2d 1550 (11 th Cir. 1990).
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opinion was vacated when the case was voted to be reheard en banc.'92
Subsequent settlements on appeal mooted the action. 93
Although the panel opinion was vacated and has no precedential
effect, its analysis remains instructive. In reinstating a verdict for the
plaintiff, the panel held that sufficient evidence supported the jury's
conclusion that the actions of the hospital and its DME joint venturer
were an illegal conspiracy to monopolize the DME market in Venice,
Florida, and impermissible monopoly leveraging. 94 The panel stated
that the plaintiff had presented sufficient evidence that the hospital
had monopoly power in the acute care market in the relevant geo-
graphic market. 95 The plaintiff's expert had also concluded that the
hospital was an essential facility in terms of DME referrals (such
"captive referrals" amounted to about 85% of all referrals from the
hospital and more than 4607o of the entire DME market). 96
The panel addressed the essential facility issue and discussed certain
aspects of the economics of vertical integration. The panel pointed out
that when hospitals vertically integrate into DME sales they can create
barriers to entry by independent DME suppliers.'97 The barrier can
arise because excluded DME suppliers may not be able to enter the
market without the referral source the hospital controls. On the other
hand, the panel recognized that hospitals are entitled to vertically inte-
grate simply to "reap the benefits of . . . integration."' '9
In its opinion, the panel noted that it was for the jury, and not the
trial court, to decide whether the hospital had entered the DME joint
venture simply to benefit from contractual vertical integration, or to
create or maintain a monopoly on its DME referral source.'" For this
reason, it was improper for the trial court to supplant the jury's judg-
ment on this issue. 2 0 The panel therefore reinstated the jury's ver-
dict. 201 As mentioned, however, the Eleventh Circuit voted to review
the case en banc but it was dismissed as moot due to intervening set-
tlements on appeal.20
2
The application of the essential facility doctrine to joint ventures
and vertical integration by hospitals into DME markets involves com-
192. 979 F.2d 806 (11 th Cir. 1992).
193. 9 F.3d 893 (11th Cir. 1993) (en banc).
194. 919 F.2d at 1565.
195. Id. at 1566.
196. Id. at 1553.
197. Id. at 1566.
198. Id. at 1568.
199. Id. at 1567-68.
200. Id. at 1567.
201. Id. at 1568-69.
202. 9 F.3d 893 (1 1th Cir. 1993) (en banc).
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peting economic considerations. Hospitals have legitimate reasons to
vertically integrate into DME to accrue the benefits of such integra-
tion. These benefits, however, must be weighed against the possibility
that hospitals are maintaining their dominance over their own captive
referral markets and thereby reducing competition and consumer wel-
fare. Whether DME referrals constitute an '"essential" facility or a
"bottleneck" depends in large measure on whether alternatives exist
and whether DME suppliers can survive without access.
CONCLUSION
Federal courts throughout the country have adopted the antitrust
essential facility doctrine despite the lack of a consensus regarding the
validity of the doctrine's legal and economic underpinnings. In the
health care industry, the essential facility doctrine has become a po-
tential weapon for health care professionals, service providers, and
medical equipment distributors to access allegedly essential facilities
such as hospitals, medical buildings, and medical equipment supply
relationships. Courts have generally ruled unfavorably for such plain-
tiffs, in part because of the failure of the plaintiffs to demonstrate
that denial of access has injured competition. Consequently, the out-
comes of the cases discussed have been consistent with the premise
that few truly "essential" facilities currently exist in the health care
industry.
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